Abstract-Network virtualization has been proposed as a powerful and flexible way to support multiple heterogeneous architectures on a shared infrastructure. A major challenge in this respect lies in the resource allocation problem that allocates the resources of Infrastructure Providers (InPs) among Service Providers (SPs) fairly and efficiently. Because of the complexity in the interaction between InPs and SPs, this problem is more complicated and needs more investigation. This paper introduces an InP-SP-End user (ISE) system model in network virtualization environment, in which we present a bandwidth allocation scheme based on VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) to maximize the total revenue of SPs by inhibiting selfish action of SPs, and design a Q-learning strategy algorithm in order to obtain optimal bidding strategies for SPs. Simulations and experimental studies demonstrate the effectiveness and the fairness of the proposed scheme, and the convergence of the proposed algorithm.
INTRODUCTION
Network virtualization has gained considerable attention [1] - [3] as it allows multiple heterogeneous network architecttures to run on a common substrate network (SN). In a network virtualization environment, the basic entity virtual network (VN) is composed of virtual routers interconnected by virtual links corresponding to physical paths in the substrate network. Here, the traditional ISPs are classified into two parts: infrastructure providers (InPs), and service providers (SPs) [3] [4] . InPs deploy and manage the physical networks, and provide physical resource to SPs. SPs can lease virtual resources from InPs to deploy their virtual networks (VNs) to offer services to the end users (EUs).
Therefore, network virtualization faces a major challenge that how to share physical resources fairly and efficiently among multiple heterogeneous VNs. And a number of resource allocation schemes have appeared in the relevant literatures [5] - [7] . The resource allocation should be observed from two different perspectives. From the perspective of InPs, it is important to keep balance between ensuring the fairness and maximizing their own revenue. From the perspective of SPs, they only focused on how to obtain enough resources. For the complex interaction between InPs and SPs, auction is introduced to solve the resource allocation problem efficiently [7] . As the sharing of bandwidth has the most direct impact on the performance of VNs, bandwidth allocation must be taken into account to provide fair utilization of the available resources [8] [9] . For instance, greedy applications crossing a VN might occupy most of the total bandwidth (physical network's bandwidth), leading to bottleneck in other VNs. In order to solve the bandwidth distribution problem, a fair and truthful auction mechanism is needed.
In this paper, we propose an InP-SP-EU model called ISE that consists of an InP, multiple SPs and EUs. We focus on the problem of bandwidth allocation when VNs have already been embedded in SN, and propose a bandwidth allocation scheme based on VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism. In our bandwidth allocation scheme, SPs have incentives to truthfully declare their bidding prices for the required resource, then the InP performs the bandwidth auction game periodically, according to the available resource and the bids SPs announce. Moreover, in order to select the bidding prices for SPs rationally in the bandwidth auction game, a Q-learning bidding strategy selection algorithm is proposed. According to the network state and the revenue of SPs, SPs select dominant strategies in the auction game through this algorithm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the related work. Section III formalizes the problem and the ISE system model overview. In Section IV, we propose our bandwidth allocation scheme, and develop a bidding strategy selection algorithm. The validation of our scheme and algorithm in the simulation environment is presented in Section V, and conclusions and future work are presented in section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The goal of resource allocation in network virtualization environment (NVE) is sharing physical resource among multiple VNs fairly and efficiently. The authors in [6] present DaVinci, an adaptive network virtualization architecture, with dynamic resource allocation scheme. In this architecture, resources are periodically reallocated among VNs, aided by optimization theoretic tools. As mentioned in [6] , any greedy or malicious behaviors from VNs will lead to the unfair allocation results. The authors in [8] focuses on the bandwidth allocation problem among multiple VNs, especially when there are bottlenecks in some VNs. Moreover, a strategy is presented to allocate fairly the bandwidth among multiple VNs sharing the same physical network. But the scheme is applied to VNs with only one service class. [9] introduce economic incentives in the form of Game Theory, and describe the interactions among multiple VNs based on the non-cooperative game model. Then a bandwidth allocation scheme is proposed based on this model. Furthermore, the InP introduces different pricing scheme according to the characteristic of different VNs. However, they do not consider that VNs is selfish to announce false bandwidth requirement in order to obtain more resources.
Recently, many researchers have used auction methods to analyze the resource allocation problem in computer networks, especially wireless networks. A sequential auction for sharing a wireless resource among competing transmitters is studied in [10] , and then the sequential second-price auction typically achieves the efficient allocation. [11] proposes VERITAS, a truthful and computationally-efficient spectrum auction system to serve many small players. In [12] , the authors propose a virtualization framework in wireless network, and model the interactions among SPs and network operator (NO) as a stochastic game, each stage of which is played by SPs and is regulated by the NO through the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. Auction has also been used in NVE. In [7] , an open market model and framework named V-Mart is presented for automated service negotiation and contracting in NVE, which uses a two-stage Vickrey auction model. Hence, we believe auction's ability to analyze the interactions among different players can help to handle problems from network virtualization, for example, the resource allocation problem.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION

A. InP-SP-End user (ISE) System Model
We introduce the InP-SP-End user (ISE) system model of the NVE. There are three main actors in a NVE: Infrastructure Provider, Service Provider and End User [2] . InPs deploy and manage the SN resources, and lease these resources to SPs. SPs deploy virtual networks with resources leased from InPs, and offer services to their customers (EUs). EUs in the NVE are similar to their counterparts in current Internet. In this paper, we simply assume that VNs have already been embedded into the SN, and VNs are already allowed to use the SN.
The system model is illustrated in Fig. 1 . In this model, a single InP dynamically managed the available network resources (e.g. bandwidth in this paper) through bandwidth control, CPU control and resource allocation. To efficiently utilize the network resources, the dynamic resource allocation is performed by the InP depending on the link conditions and traffic information of each SPs. EUs are classified into several groups based on the services they subscribe. These services are often offered by different SPs and compete for the limited network resources with other services. The user payloads above the VNs are managed and queued by the corresponding SPs. Moreover, in order to obtain enough resource for their users, SPs exchange the traffic information with the InP. The traffic information is abstracted via a satisfaction function and InP has no knowledge of how the satisfaction function is generated or updated. Since we consider that SPs are selfish, the traffic information exchange may be strategic as it will be discussed in Section IV-B.
B. Problem Description
In the model mentioned above, there is only one InP that manages the substrate network. Let the substrate network be represented by a graph G=(Node, Link), where Node is the set of nodes, Link is the set of links, denoted by = {1, … , }. We assume that each link has a fixed bandwidth capacity denoted by , where {1, … , } . Vector = { 1 , … , } represents the bandwidth capacity of each link.
The SPs are denoted by = {1, … , } ( 2), which means that m SPs co-exist in the model. We assume that each SP provides one type of service. VNs have already been embedded into the SN, each SP corresponds to a path, which is composed by a set of links. The matrix × = [ ] × is used to define the mapping between SP and SN, if link l is contained in the path which SP i passes through, then = 1, otherwise = 0. Since all the bandwidth SPs lease cannot exceed the capacity of the link, there is a constrain , where x is the bandwidth all the SPs are allocated.
The EUs are divided into m groups, according to the services they subscribe. The set of EUs subscribing to service i is denoted by . We assume that each user subscribes only one type of service , the users in our model is = | | =1 , where | | is the cardinality of the set .The utility of end user ( ) is denoted by ( ) , we assume that the utility ( ) is a concave, increasing and differential function of the allocated bandwidth . In next section, we discuss how the SN resource (i.e. available bandwidth) should be allocated to the self-interested SPs.
IV. THE BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION SCHEME The ISE system model and the bandwidth allocation problem are both presented in section III. Based on this, we introduce a novel bandwidth allocation scheme for the NVE in this section.
A. VCG-based Bandwidth Allocation Scheme
For the selfish SPs, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) [13] , an truthful auction mechanism, is introduced into our bandwidth allocation scheme. In this mechanism, SPs bid for the limited resources (i.e. bandwidth) on behalf of the EUs which have subscribed to them at each time slot.
Although the VCG mechanism has dominant strategy (i.e., announcing the truthful value function) for each bidder, and has been widely used in network resource allocation, especially the wireless network. However this mechanism requires the SPs to submit their utility function to the InP, because the bandwidth is divisible, the value functions are infinite dimensional which causes significant signaling overhead. Therefore, the scheme designed in this paper uses the onedimensional bids [14] , which represents the maximum quantity of bandwidth each SP needs.
At each time slot, SP i has the value over the potential allocated bandwidth . We denote this true value by . Since the SPs are self-interested, they have incentives to announce a bid different from . Since the strategies of SPs are represented by their bidding prices, the bidding strategy set of SP i can be represented by , which contains the true price (i.e.
). Because the biding prices of SPs are randomly selected in an auction, we only consider the set is discrete. Assuming that each SP has a countable number of strategies, so = 1 , … , where is the number of strategies SP i has. In an auction, SP i select a bid from its strategies set , the bids of all the SPs are denoted by = { 1 , … , }.
After SPs (buyers) submitting their bids, the InP (seller) performs the bandwidth allocation based on the declared bids and available network resources, and computes the payment for each SP. Then SPs pay for the resources they have obtained, and calculate their payoffs. Finally, SPs adjust the bids for next auction, according to bidding price selection algorithm which will be discussed in Section IV-B.
The role of SP i is to ask for enough resources for each of its subscribed users. The satisfaction function (i.e. the utility function) of SP i is denoted by ( ) , where is the bandwidth SP i obtains. ( ) is determined by the bidding price announced by SP i and the service level the EUs in group i are provided, which is given by ( )
where k is the weight of the user k in group i.
The objective of InP is to maximize the utility of all the SPs. In our scheme, after receiving the announced biding price , the InP performs the bandwidth allocation within the feasible bandwidth region C according to the equation below:
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Given the optimal bandwidth allocation , the InP further computes the payment for SP i as follows:
where , is the optimal bandwidth as a result of (2) when SP i is not included in the bandwidth allocation.
The payoff (i.e. the achieved utility minus the payment) of SP i is computed as follows. 
The action space of the only InP is a closed subset of , and with the constraints of , 0 , the action space of every SP is also a closed subset of . It is obvious that the utility function is continuous, and the payment of SP i is a constant, thus is continuous in the action space. Furthermore, we mean to prove the convexity of the in (4) . Since the utility function is convex, and the payment is constant, then it is obvious that is a convex function, which means it is also quasi-convex. Therefore, the Nash Equilibrium exists according to [15] .
Then we develop a Q-learning strategy algorithm to implement the scheme mentioned above and reach the Nash Equilibrium, aided by the reinforcement learning.
B. Q-learning Strategy Algorithm
In order to derive the optimal bidding strategies for the SPs in the bandwidth auction market, we propose a strategy algorithm based on Q-learning (QL). QL is a kind of Reinforcement learning (RL), which is an important machine learning technique that aims to find a strategy that maximizes reward over time [16] . Through QL-strategy algorithm, SPs will learn to improve their bidding strategies in the bandwidth auction game by updating the Q-function. To apply the algorithm, a standard formulation of states, actions, and rewards is defined as follows.
1) State Space.
We describe a state s by the following candidate features.
, the current bid of SP i; , the bandwidth allocation result for all the SPs; , the payment of SP i; , the set of users subscribed to service i; , the utility function of user k where . These features define the observable variables which can demonstrate a state s, and the state space, consist of different states described by these features, is a discrete and finite space.
2) Action. An action a is defined as selecting a strategy from the bidding strategies set and determines the bidding price. The set of actions is denoted by = 1 , … , | | . When the agent has to act, it usually should take the best action as (5), which promises the greatest benefit in the current state.
arg max ( , ) j a a Qsa 3) Reward function. The design of reward function ( , ) is based on the thought that it is a reinforcement signal that determines the decision of action and brings benefit to system performance. Agents receive a reward, which is the difference between the payoff of SP i in state s and state s', for each state-action pair. Specifically, the reward function ( , ) has the following form
According to Q-learning algorithm, each state-action pair corresponds to a Q-value denoted by Q(s, a), which represents the accumulation reward (depending on the immediate reward and the expectations of delayed reward) in the case of the agent selecting action a in state s. Meanwhile, the corresponding Qvalue will be updated according to (7 When the discount rate approaches 1, then future interaction plays a substantial role in defining the total utility values. Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode for the strategy algorithm. In this section, we simulate our experiments in the MATLAB environment. Aiming at quantifying the performance of our proposed bandwidth allocation scheme, we compare the revenue of SPs when they select various bidding strategies. Then we analyze the effect of QL-strategy algorithm and compare the QL-strategy algorithm with a Randomstrategy algorithm. The Random-strategy algorithm randomly selects bidding strategies for SPs from their strategy sets respectively.
Our experiments use the topology shown in Fig. 2 , in which SP1 and SP2 share link (A, B). The bandwidth of link (A, B) is 20Mbps. We assume the bidding strategy sets of SP1 and SP2 are B 1 ={6,8,10,12,14} and B 2 ={7,9,11,13,15}, where 10 and 11 are the true bandwidth requirements of SP1 and SP2 respectively. There are ten end users subscribe to services provided by SP1 and SP2, and have the same weight in their groups. And we define the utility function of each user as ( ) = log( ). Fig. 3 shows the revenue of SP1 (SP2) when both SP1 and SP2 select. different bidding strategies. It is apparent that the true value 10 is the dominant strategy for SP1, since no matter what strategy SP2 selects, the dominant strategy gains SP1 a larger payoff than any other in our bandwidth allocation scheme. Fig. 3 also demonstrates that the true price 11 is the dominant strategy for SP2.
1) Impact of different strategies:
2) Performance of QL-algorithm: Fig. 4 shows the probability of bidding strategies SPs select over learning times. We see that the dominant strategy 10 for SP1(i.e. the true price) is selected by SP1 with probability 1 after about 500 times learning. We can also observe from Fig. 4 that SP2 selects its dominant strategy 11. This indicates that the QL-algorithm selects dominant strategies for SPs effectively. 
3) Comparison between QL-strategy algorithm and Random-strategy algorithm:
We compare the total revenue of SPs when using QL-strategy and Random-strategy in our bandwidth allocation scheme, i.e. QL-strategy and Randomstrategy cases. Fig. 5 presents the revenue of SPs for the two cases over resource request increasing. Absolutely, QL-strategy algorithm leads to larger revenue of SPs. This significant improvement is due to SPs can accurately value the bandwidth requirements by learning from the environment. With the increase of resource requirements, the revenue grows in both cases. However, Random strategy increases with a slower speed.
In summary, we observe that the SPs have incentives to select their true price as their bids in our bandwidth allocation scheme, so the InP can fairly and effectively allocate bandwidth to SPs. And the QL-strategy algorithm, in which SPs select the dominant strategies representing their actual requirements, has a better performance compared with Random-strategy algorithm. In this paper, we have proposed ISE system model, an dynamic resource allocation framework for NVE. In this model, we approach the bandwidth allocation process as an auction game. Then a bandwidth allocation scheme is presented to provide fair allocation among multiple SPs and maximize the total revenue of SPs using VCG mechanism. In order to solve the scheme above, the Q-learning strategy selection algorithm is proposed to select the bidding strategies for SPs. Simulation results demonstrate the fairness and the effectiveness of the proposed scheme, and the convergence of the proposed algorithm.
Although this bandwidth allocation scheme is effective, it is addressed in the single InP scenario. Since the practical networks usually contain multiple InPs, it is more realistic to study the bandwidth auction with multiple auctioneers. In our future work, we will study the model with multiple InPs and SPs, in which SPs can lease resources from multiple InPs, leading to the competition among these InPs. Certainly, a more complicated bandwidth allocation scheme is required for the model mentioned above. 
